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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI/ICS 78-1202 19 October 1978

Resource Management Staff

	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Mr. William G. Bowdler Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State
25X1	FROM:	Acting Director, Policy Guidance Office
	SUBJECT:	Input to the DCI's Annual Report
25X1	due to the President The DCI has appropriate than 1 1978 characterize comprehensive represtructuring, a 30-40 pages (lastor this year's to highlight the gence; Part II is key Executive.	paration of the DCI's Annual Report for calendar year 1978, dent and the Congress by 25 January 1979, is now under way. oved a concept for this year's Annual Report which is more ast year's, both because this seems more appropriate to a ed by attention to key intelligence issues rather than the port approach used for 1977 as a year of extensive community nd also to limit length for a busy reader to a manageable t year's ran 80 plus). The DCI has also approved an outline report (Attachment 1). Part I is designed to allow the DCI particular characteristics and emphases of 1978 in intellisintended to air several issues of great importance to him, e users, and the Congress. The Annual Report will carry ation and receive extremely limited distribution.
25X1	Annual Report ge	itionally, in a 15 September 1978 letter to the DCI on the nerally, Chairman Boland of the HPSCI asked that INR's ven more treatment in this year's Annual Report.
25X1	Report outline of particular INR is of INR's 1978 produced substantive area public perception following specifiand input, but p	would appreciate your thoughts on any aspect of the Annual n which you care to contribute. We identify as areas of nterest and expertise, however, the following: highlights oduction year; several (perhaps all?) of the selective s; quality of analysis and policy support; and perhaps ns of and attitudes toward intelligence. We offer the ic questions and comments to help structure your thoughts lease feel free to modify these as appropriate and also to of your input as your specific interests, resources, etc.,
25X1	what has require in 1978 (and eve	ected substantive issues: Here the key criteria involve d greatly increased analytical attention or altered emphasis n at that we will be able to discuss only a few especially meeting the criteria). Our nominees are these:

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	a. significant Soviet trends affecting the strategic balance, an	d

- experience in communicating these effectively to national security planners; e.g.:
 - -- pace of accuracy improvements in Soviet ICBMs; other?

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- -- experience in communicating implications for the US of alternative Soviet force projections in ways more realistic and helpful than static measures alone, without preempting the policy prerogative of full force interaction analysis
- b. growth in requirements for intelligence support to arms limitation talks; e.g.:
 - -- beyond SALT and MBFR to CTB, ASAT, CAT, Indian Ocean; examples of new substantive issues requiring analysis
 - -- harder SALT verification challenges (cruise missiles, planning for verification analysis in the MAP era, etc.)
 - -- need for integrated analysis for whole broadening arms limitation field, coordinated production management, consistent standards for delegation support, etc.
- c. How has intelligence charted the much more activist role of China in the outside world in 1978 and analyzed its implications?
 - d. intelligence support to African crises (Horn, Shaba II, etc.):
 - -- the 1978 intelligence challenge of analyzing the several African hot spots themselves, whether together they would intensify/proliferate/coalesce, or whether separately they would plateau under specific combinations of local and external factors
 - -- analytical support to diplomatic negotiations (Rhodesia).
- Is the foregoing the best short list of issues? For example:
- a. Has the greatly increased direct US role in Middle East Arab-Israeli peace negotiations placed substantial new support demands on intelligence, or are there indications that it will?
- b. Our impression is that 1977, not 1978, marked the quantum increase in intelligence analysis of global issues, but perhaps not; are there significant new things to say this year about intelligence support on human rights, nuclear proliferation, etc.?
- c. Would a word on intelligence support on such worrisome situations as Iran, or perhaps Afghanistan, be worthwhile?

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	6. To some degree the substantive intelligence issues you consider for 1978 should coincide with highlights of INR's production year, including shifts in direction or emphasis in policy support. You may additionally wish however, to make a management overview comment on the year in INR; e.g., including manpower constraints. Do you care to nominate one or more new or e panding issues that will require major analytical attention/new directions in 1979? Or significant present areas in which you feel skimpily equipped analytically?	, x-
٠	7. We very much want INR's perspective on the Part II issue of qual of analysis and policy support; we are, of course, also asking a number of other intelligence community components for their perspectives. What approach to staying in touch with policy users' needs have you found useful within the Department? How do you try to do the same thing for key external users; e.g. the NSC Staff? What feedback do you get from external users? Given your stringent personnel situation, how do you make trade-off decisions apportioning effort among ongoing daily support to the Secretary and other key users, more in-depth analysis on specific policy issues, and participation in community intelligence production? Are you able to allocate much effort to in-depth research? How important are "face-to-face" support relationships with key Department policy officers, and an ongoing dialogue with officers visiting to or from missions overseas proportionate to intelligence support via formal written production?	hes , ng
	8. To the degree that you can separate out public attitudes about intelligence from public concerns about the foreign policy issues you may be discussing, what trends do you note in public attitudes about intelligence from public appearances of INR officers? Are there any notable shifts from 1977?	
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	Attachments: 1. DCI Revised Outline - AR for 1978 2. DCI letter to NFIB principals requesting help on Annual Report 3. Boland letter to DCI (15 Sep w/atts & DCI interim reply	

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Original & 1 - INR (Bowdler)w/atts
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DCI/RMS/PGO/ [19 Oct 78)